Opinion
Posted on 08:33 PM, September 15, 2010
Calling A Spade... -- By Solita Collas-Monsod
A safety net for the poor
The secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Devlopment has been getting a lot of flak lately about the more-than-doubling of the DSWD 2011 budget to finance the government’s Conditional Cash Transfer program, known locally as the 4Ps or the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program. The objections which arise from various sectors -- religious, activists, politicans -- have one thing in common: they think that the program is a dole-out, probably given with ulterior motives, and therefore is at best useless.
Senator Ralph Recto has been quoted as saying that the Philippine program has "not proven to be effective in reaching the parameters set under the UN’s Millennium Development Goals." Others claim that the money would be better spent providing employment for the household head.
Let me disabuse the critics. First, it is NOT a dole-out.
It is a contract between the government and the household, where in return for the cash transfer, the family must fulfill certain conditions regarding education and health. If the conditions are not fulfilled, the money stops coming.
Exactly who can be the contractors, and what are the terms of the contract? To qualify for the program, the household income must be below the provincial poverty threshold, must either have a pregnant woman or children 14 years old and below.
And the terms of the contract are that for P500 a month, the following health safeguards must be in place: the pregnant women must avail of pre-and post-natal care and be attended during childbirth by a health professional; parents must attend responsible parenthood, parent effectiveness, and mother’s classes; children below 5 must receive preventive health checkups and vaccines, and children 6-14 must receive deworming pills twice a year. And for P3,000 a year each for a maximum of 3 children, the following education conditions must also be met: Children from 3-5 years old must have an attendance rate of 85% or higher in preschool or day care classes; children from 6-14 must have an attendance rate of at least 85% in elementary and/or high school classes.
And there is a unique feature here: the cash is received by the woman of the house, and for a very valid reason -- it has been found that women’s expenditure patterns are more focused on basic human priorities than those of their male counterparts.
Thus, the minimum amount that qualified household gets a year is P9,000 (with one child who is at least 3 years old) and the maximum is P15,000 (with three children up to age 14).
The second point that must be made is that while, as Sen Recto says, the CCT in the Philippines has not proven to be effective in reaching the UN Millennium Development Goals, that is not because it is a bad program, but because it hasn’t had time to take effect, and has had, so far, very little reach.
It was piloted in late 20007, and was supposed to have reached 123,000 poor families in 2008, and will reach 900,000 families by the end of this year.
Compare these to the number of households living below the poverty line in 2006: 4.68 million. Even if the percentage of poor familes has been estimated to have decreased marginally since then, the absolute number will have increased.
It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to conclude that the program is not going to have that much effect on the poverty situation.
Which is why the DSWD is more than doubling its budget, for the CCT, with the encouragement of both the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, who are financing the program through loans.
And why are the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and by the way, the United Nations, so enthusiastic about the program?
Very simply because it has generally succeeded in many other countries -- 17 at last count. So much so that Nancy Birdsall of the Center for Global Development has been quoted as saying that "these programs are as close as you can come to a magic bullet in development."
Why? Because evaluation studies show that they have significant beneficial impacts on schooling, health, infant mortality, child labor, and poverty. And on inequality as well.
What essentially the CCT boils down to is a social protection or safety net for those suffering from income poverty in the short run, that also addresses outcome poverty at the same time, building human capabilities so that in the long run, the intergenerational transfer of poverty is short-circuited.
There is always room for improvement, of course.And the success of the CCT in terms of human development outcomes will depend on the availability of the schools, health centers, and other facilities that are needed by the poor to fulfill their part of the contract, as well as the accessibility of the source of funds for the women. Not to mention the ability of the DSWD to target the poor without political interference.
Is P30 billion too costly a program? Compared to the subsidies given by the government to some of its GOCCs (with less or even nothing to show for it), not to mention the humongous government corporate debt that the national government has had to take over over the past 25, the CCT is not only reasonable, but certainly well worth it.
One must congratulate the Aquino government for putting its money where its mouth is with regard to poverty and development. If anything, it should be spending even more, as as long as the proper safeguards are met.
In any event, the CCT represents the Philippines’ only chance to make significant gains in achieving our Millennium Development Goals. Let us all be reminded that given the current (sans CCT) pace of progress, halving the 1990 income poverty incidence will only be achieved in 2026, reducing the 1990 maternal mortality rates will be reached only in 2048, universal elementary school completion in 2075.
Come to think of it, the success of this administration’s CCT program may yet go down in history as one of its most important accomplishments.
Friday, September 17, 2010
Thursday, September 9, 2010
Not Enough
BusinessWorld Opinion
Posted on 09:05 PM, September 08, 2010
Calling A Spade... -- By Solita Collas-Monsod
"Not enough"
The government launched its Fourth Progress Report on the Millennium Development Goals, showing the Philippines’ pace of progress with regard to the 21 targets and 60 indicators that are being used to determine whether these MDGs are being met. President Noynoy Aquino and House Speaker Sonny Belmonte led the list of attendees (together with former President Fidel Ramos) -- which presumably sent the structural message that achieving the goals were of the highest importance to our leadership.
In his speech, PNOY emphasized that it was the responsibility of every Filipino citizen, not solely of the goernment, to help achieve these goals.
It would have helped if the President had reminded us of what the stakes are -- so that people would not simply dismiss the speech as just motherhood statements.
It has been estimated, for example, that achieving these goals means, among others, that more than 10 million people would be lifted out of poverty (between 2006 and 2015); more than 2 million people would be no longer go hungry; 240,000 more children would be able to reach their fifth birthday; 12 thousand mothers’ lives would be saved, and almost 7 million more people would have access to safe water. That would surely make everyone sit up and take notice.
The report, based on actual performance versus the target levels, evaluates the probability of achieving the goals (broken down into several targets and even more indicators) -- as either "low," "medium" or "high" -- using methodology suggested by the UN Statistical Insitute for Asia and the Pacific (SIAP).
But the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) has another methodology which is more useful, and certainly more colorful and more specific: it determines whether a country is an "early achiever" (a dark green circle) or "on track" (a light green triangle) or "off-track slow" (an orange square) or "off- track regressing" (a red upside down triangle), depending on, respectively, whether the achievements have already been achieved, or will be achieved on or before the target date of 2015, will be achieved, but after 2015, or whether the country is actually regressing (moving backward) rather than progressing. Moreover, the year the target will be achieved (given the country’s present pace of progress) can also be derived.
For example: MDG Goal 1a, which is to halve the proportion of population living below the poverty threshold is, in the Fourth Progress Report, rated as of "Medium" Probability. Using the ESCAP method, the country’s progress toward this goal is rated as off-track, slow, and will be achieved, at current pace, only in 2023 -- or eight years after 2015. With regard to the population living below the food or subsistence threshold, the probability of attaining the target is classified as "High"; but using the ESCAP method will tell us that using the country’s official poverty data (which should not be used because the poverty data over time are not comparable), the target will be achieved by 2011; and using the Balisacan estimates (which can be compared over space and time) will show that the target will be achieved by 2016, and therefore the country is off-track, slow.
And if one thinks that "off-track, slow" means a delay of one to eight years, think again. The probability of achieving the goal of universal completion of primary or elementary education is considered "Medium" as measured by the cohort survival rate; using the ESCAP methodology reveals that not only is the country "off-track, slow," but that at its current pace of progress, it will achieve the target only -- are you ready for this, reader? -- by 2070. The elementary school education completion rate, which has a "Medium" probability in the report, will be achieved only in 2075.
Or take MSG Goal 5, which is to improve maternal health, as measured by the maternal mortality ratio, and the contraceptive prevalence rate. The report rates the probability of achieving these targets by 2015 as both "Low." But using the ESCAP methodology tells us that at the current rate of progress, reducing maternal mortality ratio by three-fourths from its 1993 levels will be achieved not in 2015, but in 2064; while doubling the contraceptive prevalence rate from its 1993 levels will occur only in 2048.
Clearly, saying that the probability of achievement is "Medium" gives us a false sense of security, and makes these development challenges seem picayune; and considering a goal as having a "Low" probability of achievement is not enough. We have to be aware of what the time horizons are. Because it is one thing to say that the probability of having 100 children who started Grade 1 reach grade 5 is "Medium"; but it is shocking to hear that this so-called 100% target cohort survival rate"can be achieved only in 2070, or 55 years after the target date of 2015.
In other words, the Philippine performance in these areas is unacceptable, and must be reversed. It is not enough to say we will double or triple our efforts, because even then, that will not guarantee that the targets will be met. It is not enough to say that without corruption, there will be no poverty. Integrity is not sufficient. Commitment (political will) and competence are at least as important.
Posted on 09:05 PM, September 08, 2010
Calling A Spade... -- By Solita Collas-Monsod
"Not enough"
The government launched its Fourth Progress Report on the Millennium Development Goals, showing the Philippines’ pace of progress with regard to the 21 targets and 60 indicators that are being used to determine whether these MDGs are being met. President Noynoy Aquino and House Speaker Sonny Belmonte led the list of attendees (together with former President Fidel Ramos) -- which presumably sent the structural message that achieving the goals were of the highest importance to our leadership.
In his speech, PNOY emphasized that it was the responsibility of every Filipino citizen, not solely of the goernment, to help achieve these goals.
It would have helped if the President had reminded us of what the stakes are -- so that people would not simply dismiss the speech as just motherhood statements.
It has been estimated, for example, that achieving these goals means, among others, that more than 10 million people would be lifted out of poverty (between 2006 and 2015); more than 2 million people would be no longer go hungry; 240,000 more children would be able to reach their fifth birthday; 12 thousand mothers’ lives would be saved, and almost 7 million more people would have access to safe water. That would surely make everyone sit up and take notice.
The report, based on actual performance versus the target levels, evaluates the probability of achieving the goals (broken down into several targets and even more indicators) -- as either "low," "medium" or "high" -- using methodology suggested by the UN Statistical Insitute for Asia and the Pacific (SIAP).
But the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) has another methodology which is more useful, and certainly more colorful and more specific: it determines whether a country is an "early achiever" (a dark green circle) or "on track" (a light green triangle) or "off-track slow" (an orange square) or "off- track regressing" (a red upside down triangle), depending on, respectively, whether the achievements have already been achieved, or will be achieved on or before the target date of 2015, will be achieved, but after 2015, or whether the country is actually regressing (moving backward) rather than progressing. Moreover, the year the target will be achieved (given the country’s present pace of progress) can also be derived.
For example: MDG Goal 1a, which is to halve the proportion of population living below the poverty threshold is, in the Fourth Progress Report, rated as of "Medium" Probability. Using the ESCAP method, the country’s progress toward this goal is rated as off-track, slow, and will be achieved, at current pace, only in 2023 -- or eight years after 2015. With regard to the population living below the food or subsistence threshold, the probability of attaining the target is classified as "High"; but using the ESCAP method will tell us that using the country’s official poverty data (which should not be used because the poverty data over time are not comparable), the target will be achieved by 2011; and using the Balisacan estimates (which can be compared over space and time) will show that the target will be achieved by 2016, and therefore the country is off-track, slow.
And if one thinks that "off-track, slow" means a delay of one to eight years, think again. The probability of achieving the goal of universal completion of primary or elementary education is considered "Medium" as measured by the cohort survival rate; using the ESCAP methodology reveals that not only is the country "off-track, slow," but that at its current pace of progress, it will achieve the target only -- are you ready for this, reader? -- by 2070. The elementary school education completion rate, which has a "Medium" probability in the report, will be achieved only in 2075.
Or take MSG Goal 5, which is to improve maternal health, as measured by the maternal mortality ratio, and the contraceptive prevalence rate. The report rates the probability of achieving these targets by 2015 as both "Low." But using the ESCAP methodology tells us that at the current rate of progress, reducing maternal mortality ratio by three-fourths from its 1993 levels will be achieved not in 2015, but in 2064; while doubling the contraceptive prevalence rate from its 1993 levels will occur only in 2048.
Clearly, saying that the probability of achievement is "Medium" gives us a false sense of security, and makes these development challenges seem picayune; and considering a goal as having a "Low" probability of achievement is not enough. We have to be aware of what the time horizons are. Because it is one thing to say that the probability of having 100 children who started Grade 1 reach grade 5 is "Medium"; but it is shocking to hear that this so-called 100% target cohort survival rate"can be achieved only in 2070, or 55 years after the target date of 2015.
In other words, the Philippine performance in these areas is unacceptable, and must be reversed. It is not enough to say we will double or triple our efforts, because even then, that will not guarantee that the targets will be met. It is not enough to say that without corruption, there will be no poverty. Integrity is not sufficient. Commitment (political will) and competence are at least as important.
Wednesday, September 8, 2010
Noynoy Flunks His First Test
The Wall Street Journal
Tuesday, September 7, 2010
Page 15
By Maria A. Ressa
Filipinos have high hopes for President Benigno "Noynoy" Aquino III, who took power two months ago with the largest margin of victory in two decades and an 85% approval rating. His popularity rested mostly on promises of good values and cleaner governance--promises his mother, democracy icon Cory Aquino, made too. Yet his first major test in office shows how early political compromises are exacerbating problems in the weak institutions he's promised to reform.
On Aug. 23, a disgruntled former police officer took a tourist bus hostage and after a long stand-off, killed eight passengers, all Hong Kongers. The government's response was an excercise in incompetence. In public hearings that began Friday, police and politicians admitted that untrained, ill-equipped forces were used while elite units were put on standby; that national leaders played no role in the crisis response despite foreigners' involvement; and that ad hoc, unclear lines of communication between local politicians and local police complicated matters. To add insult to injury, the authorities in charge left the scene to eat in a nearby Chinese restaurant precisely when the killings began.
The incident sparked outrage in Hong Kong, where the government has called for an independent investigation and compensation for the victims' families. But Mr. Aquino only belatedly realized the gravity of the situation. His first instinct was to blame the national media for covering the event live, a sentiment that citizens in the blogosphere and on Twitter quickly echoed. When the hearings did little to quell public anger on Friday--two weeks after the fiasco--he claimed responsibility "for everything that has transpired."
There is truth in that assertion. The agencies tasked with resolving the hostage crisis--the Department of the Interior and Local Government and the Palace [sic] Communications [G]roup--are divided into two political factions, both of which are competing for political influence. Instead of choosing between them, Mr. Aquino rewarded both with high cabinet offices.
The first, the Samar faction, is named after the street where one of Mr. Aquino's campaign headquarters was located, and includes former aides and officials with long personal ties to the president and his family. Many of them, like National Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin, served under Mr. Aquino's mother's government in 1986. The second, the Balay faction, is associated with the Liberal Party and former cabinet secretaries who publicly challeneged Mr. Aquino's predecessor, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Younger and perceived as more professional, the Balay group is also associated with Senator Mar Roxas, Mr. Aquino's vice-presidential candidate who did not win election.
These factional splits played a big role in last month's bungled response to the hostage crisis. The Department of the Interior and Local Government is in charge of both local government and security, and the Secretary of the Interior usually controls the Philippine National Police. But in July, President Aquino stripped Secretary Jesse Robredo, who belongs to the Balay faction, of his powers over the police.
Mr. Aquino handed leadership to an underqualified member of the Samar faction, his personal friend and "shooting" partner, Interior Undersecretary Rico E. Puno. During the crisis, Mr. Puno exerted almost no leadership, preferring to let the local police handle the situation. There was little crowd control, and a local radio station was allowed to speak to the hostage-taker in the final moments of the crisis. During the later hearings, Mr. Puno said, "I am not capable of handling hostage situations. . . . I am not trained to do that."
The factions also played a role in the management of public informatoin and press coverage. The Palace [sic] Communications Group, which in the past was headed by one press secretary, now has three leaders with cabinet secretary rank: the Samar faction's Sonny coloma and the Balay faction's Edwin Lacierda and Ricky Carandang, the latter of whom is a former television news anchor for my news organization. Thus on the fateful day, the administration had trouble deciding what to say and how to say it. Local officials were left to handle messaging, focusing on the details rather than the broader substance and impact of the day's events. Hong Kong's chief executive Donald Tsang was even prevented from talking to Mr. Aquino.
For many Filipinos, this bungling is wearingly familiar. The country has a famously weak system of law and order which often sees criminals go unpunished. Mr. Aquino ran for office promising to clean up this culture of corruption. That's why the hostage crisis was so disturbing: It was a disastrous example of incompetence, political factionalism and lack of national leadership.
All of which points back to the president's office. Like his mother, President Aquino is easy-going, well-liked by his peers, and shies away from controversy and conflict. That manner of governance might have worked in the House and Senate, where he failed to initiate or pass any bill, but it doesn't work in the president's office. The Samar and Balay factional split represents a real test of Mr. Aquino's leadership--between familiar, highly valued personal loyalty and generational change and professionalism.
The president's indecisiveness has already indirectly led to one tragedy. The coming weeks will show whether he can learn from his mistakes, or whether the Philippines is in for another Aquino presidency that has good intentions but bungled outcomes.
Ms. Ressa is the head of news and current affairs at ABS-CBN Broadcasting and the author of "Seeds of Terror" (Free Press, 2003).
Tuesday, September 7, 2010
Page 15
By Maria A. Ressa
Filipinos have high hopes for President Benigno "Noynoy" Aquino III, who took power two months ago with the largest margin of victory in two decades and an 85% approval rating. His popularity rested mostly on promises of good values and cleaner governance--promises his mother, democracy icon Cory Aquino, made too. Yet his first major test in office shows how early political compromises are exacerbating problems in the weak institutions he's promised to reform.
On Aug. 23, a disgruntled former police officer took a tourist bus hostage and after a long stand-off, killed eight passengers, all Hong Kongers. The government's response was an excercise in incompetence. In public hearings that began Friday, police and politicians admitted that untrained, ill-equipped forces were used while elite units were put on standby; that national leaders played no role in the crisis response despite foreigners' involvement; and that ad hoc, unclear lines of communication between local politicians and local police complicated matters. To add insult to injury, the authorities in charge left the scene to eat in a nearby Chinese restaurant precisely when the killings began.
The incident sparked outrage in Hong Kong, where the government has called for an independent investigation and compensation for the victims' families. But Mr. Aquino only belatedly realized the gravity of the situation. His first instinct was to blame the national media for covering the event live, a sentiment that citizens in the blogosphere and on Twitter quickly echoed. When the hearings did little to quell public anger on Friday--two weeks after the fiasco--he claimed responsibility "for everything that has transpired."
There is truth in that assertion. The agencies tasked with resolving the hostage crisis--the Department of the Interior and Local Government and the Palace [sic] Communications [G]roup--are divided into two political factions, both of which are competing for political influence. Instead of choosing between them, Mr. Aquino rewarded both with high cabinet offices.
The first, the Samar faction, is named after the street where one of Mr. Aquino's campaign headquarters was located, and includes former aides and officials with long personal ties to the president and his family. Many of them, like National Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin, served under Mr. Aquino's mother's government in 1986. The second, the Balay faction, is associated with the Liberal Party and former cabinet secretaries who publicly challeneged Mr. Aquino's predecessor, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Younger and perceived as more professional, the Balay group is also associated with Senator Mar Roxas, Mr. Aquino's vice-presidential candidate who did not win election.
These factional splits played a big role in last month's bungled response to the hostage crisis. The Department of the Interior and Local Government is in charge of both local government and security, and the Secretary of the Interior usually controls the Philippine National Police. But in July, President Aquino stripped Secretary Jesse Robredo, who belongs to the Balay faction, of his powers over the police.
Mr. Aquino handed leadership to an underqualified member of the Samar faction, his personal friend and "shooting" partner, Interior Undersecretary Rico E. Puno. During the crisis, Mr. Puno exerted almost no leadership, preferring to let the local police handle the situation. There was little crowd control, and a local radio station was allowed to speak to the hostage-taker in the final moments of the crisis. During the later hearings, Mr. Puno said, "I am not capable of handling hostage situations. . . . I am not trained to do that."
The factions also played a role in the management of public informatoin and press coverage. The Palace [sic] Communications Group, which in the past was headed by one press secretary, now has three leaders with cabinet secretary rank: the Samar faction's Sonny coloma and the Balay faction's Edwin Lacierda and Ricky Carandang, the latter of whom is a former television news anchor for my news organization. Thus on the fateful day, the administration had trouble deciding what to say and how to say it. Local officials were left to handle messaging, focusing on the details rather than the broader substance and impact of the day's events. Hong Kong's chief executive Donald Tsang was even prevented from talking to Mr. Aquino.
For many Filipinos, this bungling is wearingly familiar. The country has a famously weak system of law and order which often sees criminals go unpunished. Mr. Aquino ran for office promising to clean up this culture of corruption. That's why the hostage crisis was so disturbing: It was a disastrous example of incompetence, political factionalism and lack of national leadership.
All of which points back to the president's office. Like his mother, President Aquino is easy-going, well-liked by his peers, and shies away from controversy and conflict. That manner of governance might have worked in the House and Senate, where he failed to initiate or pass any bill, but it doesn't work in the president's office. The Samar and Balay factional split represents a real test of Mr. Aquino's leadership--between familiar, highly valued personal loyalty and generational change and professionalism.
The president's indecisiveness has already indirectly led to one tragedy. The coming weeks will show whether he can learn from his mistakes, or whether the Philippines is in for another Aquino presidency that has good intentions but bungled outcomes.
Ms. Ressa is the head of news and current affairs at ABS-CBN Broadcasting and the author of "Seeds of Terror" (Free Press, 2003).
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