Taking
a break from TheEconomizer’s coverage of rising inflation in the Philippines, this
post responds to a Forbes.com blog post written by Mr. Jesse Colombo, who is a
contributor to Forbes magazine. In
that post, entitled “Here's Why The Philippines’ Economic Miracle Is Really A
Bubble In Disguise”, Mr. Colombo argued that the Philippines’ recent economic
performance, in which the country’s GDP grew—at an average of 7% per year—in
some quarters faster than China’s, is traceable to China’s own $586-billion
economic stimulus program launched in 2009.
This
program, in Mr. Colombo’s telling, “drove a global raw materials boom (and
bubble) that benefited commodities exporters such as Australia and emerging
market nations.” The resulting bubble also drew air—not to say strength—from the US Federal Reserve’s
quantitative easing, which accompanied the fall of short-term US dollar rates to
almost zero.
Mr.
Colombo argues convincingly and TheEconomizer does not intend to refute him. His
post was published on 21 November 2013, and events in the succeeding nine
months have proven him to be close to the mark, since the formerly high-flying Philippine
economy has seen its year-on-year GDP growth fall to 5.7% in the latest quarter
while inflation is creeping up.
However,
one of the pieces of evidence he cites in his post (and there are many) is that
“[i]nvestors’ insatiable hunger for emerging market debt has caused the
Philippines’ external debt to spike in recent years”. Immediately following
that line is a column graph showing just such a spike starting in 2011. This chart
is irreconcilable to the recent push—well-known to observers and analysts and
ordinary newspaper readers alike—by the Philippine government to replace
foreign debt with domestic borrowings, including the much-publicized issuance
of US dollar bonds in the domestic market almost exactly a year before (in November 2012). Because of this, TheEconomizer proceeded
to check publicly available data surrounding the Philippines’ external debt.
Investors’ insatiable hunger for emerging market debt has caused the Philippines’ external debt to spike in recent years:
Source: http://www.forbes.com/sites/jessecolombo/2013/11/21/heres-why-the-philippines-economic-miracle-is-really-a-bubble-in-disguise/
These show
that whereas in 1998 and 1999 external borrowings were about 46% and 75%,
respectively, of domestic borrowings, by 2007 the figure fell to 36%, before
the global financial crisis. In the wake of the financial crisis, external borrowings
shot up again, but market conditions soon stabilized that by 2012, at the
height of the bubble-causing capital flows already pointed out by Mr. Colombo, foreign
borrowing fell to 20% of domestic, and in 2013 fell further to 6%. Granted,
there was emerging-market volatility in the summer of 2013 as foreign funds
fled from India, which impaired the Philippines’ ability to borrow at a reasonable
rate from abroad, but the point that external debt rose starting in 2011 is not
backed up by the data. In fact, as a share of domestic borrowing, it was the
same as in 2010 and lower than in 2009.
These
data can be found on the BSPs website, which is further sourced from the Bureau
of the Treasury. The graphs below are drawn to the same scale, for ease of
comparison between domestic and foreign borrowings over the past 16 years. The
Philippines’ fiscal position has undergone a truly fundamental transformation
over this period, and such a description cannot be dismissed as mere hyperbole.
From 60% of domestic borrowing in 2001, domestic interest payments fell to 40%
in 2011 and 33.7% in 2013, the first and indisputable proof of the enormous, favorable
shift in the government’s reputation and credibility in managing the public
finances. No longer is government debt issuance seen as the herald of fiscal
irresponsibility, but as the sought-after instruments of liquidity, the necessary
grease for the national financial machinery. That the fall in borrowing cost
was gradual but consistent and that it happened during the years when the
government was thought corrupt simply proves that perception most often happens
to be at variance with reality. The borrowings themselves show no sign of
abating, signifying that a change in presidential administrations portended no fear
of deficit spending; rather, the fall in borrowing costs may have even encouraged such spending.
On the
other hand, the picture of external interest payments does not reflect this
shift in government credibility because of factors unknown to TheEconomizer. But
the point here is merely to emphasize that, given the reduction in the
government’s cost of borrowing domestically, it is only natural to reach the
conclusion that replacing foreign borrowing with domestic borrowing is sound financial
practice. Looking at external borrowings at their US dollar value (i.e.,
without the distortions introduced by the translation to Philippine pesos), one
can see that in absolute terms external borrowings in 2013 were lower than
2012, which is lower than 2011, which is lower than 2010. So far, TheEconomizer
has found no evidence that external borrowings have been increasing since 2011.
Looking
at the source data from the Bureau of the Treasury, one finds a report on
outstanding amounts, which does show an increase in debts from foreign sources.
In contrast to borrowings which represent flows, the outstanding debt report
shows the stock of debt at the end of the reporting period, which in this case
is the same as the calendar year. (It is important to note as well that the BTr
discloses the exchange rate it used for each year to translate the dollar
borrowings into their peso value, which is vital to researchers looking at
their data.)
In the
years 2010 to 2013, the Philippines’ outstanding foreign bonds were 27, 28, 29,
and 28 billion US dollars, respectively, while other direct obligations stood
at 19, 20, 19, and 16 billion US dollars. Needless to say, this is the result
of the fall in external borrowings in those years. No matter how one looks at the data, it cannot be said that there was an increase in external financing or in the stock of outstanding debt. What can be seen, by contrast, is the increasing confidence of the government to borrow from the capital markets. The year 2003 was significant; before that, bonds took up a proportionally smaller share of foreign debt, and that year it was 50-50; but after that, the greater majority of Philippine foreign debt consisted of foreign bonds, which are subject to all sorts of market forces unlike, say, official assistance from governments and international organizations. In a year such as 2013, when the government issued absolutely no global bonds or “RP bonds” (whatever the BTr means by that), the outstanding debt unsurprisingly fell.
What can also be seen (particularly in this BTr report) is that responsible and prudent management of foreign debt did not start in the last four years or so; in 2008, there was a slight but perceptible drop in the stock of foreign bonds. Even when comparing 2009 vs 2008, when outstanding foreign bonds increased by US$3 billion, and gross external borrowings increased more than 3-and-a-half times from US$1.5 to US$5.4 billion, the amount raised from global bonds was less than in 2005, at US$3,334 million vs US$3,372 million. Today's prudent management of foreign debt, like the reduction in cost of borrowings for domestic debt, is a continuation—as opposed to an innovation—by today's fiscal managers.
In sum, none of the reports
of the Bureau of the Treasury offers evidence of a jump in external borrowings
or in the stock of outstanding foreign debt. What the data show is the continuously improving external-debt position of the Philippines, which has been going on for the better part of a decade.
(CORRECTION: An earlier version of this post indicated that the Philippine government domestic US dollar bond was issued in November 2013. This post has been updated to reflect the correct date of November 2012.)
(CORRECTION: An earlier version of this post indicated that the Philippine government domestic US dollar bond was issued in November 2013. This post has been updated to reflect the correct date of November 2012.)
The government blames hoarders and profiteers i.e. business. It should blame itself with misguided and utterly senseless policies!
BIR issues guidelines for importer, broker accreditation
All applications for accreditations will have to be filed directly with the ARMD with applicants appearing personally at the unit.
Processing of application will take 15 working days. Once approved, the ICC and BCC will be valid for three years, unless revoked or cancelled earlier.
The ARMD will conduct periodic verification of compliance by accredited importers and brokers on a semestral basis or more often if necessary, RMO 10-2014 said.
BIR’s Systems Development Division (SDD) will develop a script for the regular extraction of data from existing BIR information technology systems to facilitate the ARMD’s conduct of the periodic compliance verification and tracking of, among others, data that will be transferred to the Data Warehouse Systems Operations Division (DWSD).
The DWSD will then check and accept the script developed by SDD for the regular extraction of tax compliance data of taxpayers who are applying for accreditation or who have been accredited after complying with the existing issuance on script turnover procedures and requirements.
Disaccredited importers or brokers can file for a reaccreditation one year after being disaccredited. They can also file for reconsideration with the Internal Revenue commissioner on any decision of the assistant commissioner for Collection Service.
The ICC and BCC may also be cancelled or revoked by the BIR upon discovery of any valid or compelling causes or reasons to do so.
Customs suspends 115 importers, brokers
DOF easing importer accreditation procedures
April 30, 2014
Share this:
Disaccreditation of importers
Importer, broker accreditation extended
Brokers’ strike
Some brokers’ groups began a strike on June 26 with the intention to carry the activity through June 30, in protest of the new DOF, BIR and BOC accreditation regulations.
The groups along with the Chamber of Customs Brokers, Inc. (CCBI) were called to a meeting by Finance Undersecretary Carlo Carag on Friday.
Samson Gabisan, CCBI executive vice president, told PortCalls in a phone interview CCBI members are not joining the brokers’ holiday.
In the Friday meeting with the DOF, Gabisan said CCBI requested the accreditation extension be moved to December 31.
CCBI also asked for the “synchronization” of BIR and BOC requirements for accreditation to avoid redundancies.
Slow application
As of June 17, Uvero said only 600 applicants have been processed by the BIR (see related story below).
Moreover, Flores said AMO received letters from stakeholders who fear non-processing of their shipments because the importer/customs broker was not able to comply with the deadline due to lack of requirements.
Importer, broker accreditation extended by another month
on August 1, 2014 or the date of expiration as indicated in the original BOC accreditation, whichever is earlier.”